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IV
Why Great Britain Entered the Great War
By Norman Simms

Throughout the Twentieth Century and into the Twenty-First, many causes have
been proposed for why Great Britain entered World War I (the Great War) on the side of
France and Russia. Extensive research has indicated that the three most probable causes
were the naval arms race, the German atrocities committed in occupied territories, and
the violation of Belgium neutrality. Of these three, the violation of Belgium neutrality is
most strongly supported as the ultimate reason why England committed itself militarily to
the Entente.
The book, “Twenty-Five Years” was written by Sir Edward Grey (official title:
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, K.G.) who served as Secretary of Foreign Relations of Great
Britain from 1892 tol895, again from 1905 to 1916, and died in 1933. Grey’s twovolume autobiography was first published in 1925 and focuses on the political and
diplomatic aspects of the war. It is unique because of Grey’s governmental position prior
to and during the war and because it was written outside the context of the World War II.
Grey first discusses the naval arms race as a possible cause o f England’s eventual
decision to enter the war. For most of the Nineteenth Century, Great Britain had been
involved in a naval arms race with France and Russia. Britain had relied primarily on its
navy to enact its foreign policy and maintained a policy in which it kept its fleet bigger
than the next two biggest navies combined. Prior naval conflicts with France and Russia
led England’s Head of Foreign Relations, Arthur Neville Chamberlain, to offer an
alliance to Germany in a speech given at Leicester on 30 November 1899 (almost five
years prior to England’s declaration of war against Germany.) His justification was that
England had the strongest navy in the world, Germany had the greatest army in the
world, and the fleet and army couldn’t fight; thus an alliance between the two would
allow both sides to “maintain their own interests and keep Europe in order[, but].. .the
suggestion for an alliance with [England] was coldly received in Germany;
consequently, Germany embarked on the creation of a great navy, England sought
alliance with Japan (Japan navy’s was the dominant power in the Asiatic oceans,) and
England sought peace with France (who was allied with Russia.) The friendship between
England and France freed England from concern over the French and Russian navies. In
Grey, Edward, Sir. 25 Years. NY: 1925. Fredrick Astokes Comp. Pg 220
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addition, it opened up communication between the General Staff and the Admiralty of
both countries that allowed discussion concerning plans to deal with a possible attack on
either country; however, England was careful to ensure that the discussions did not
obligate either country to fight if one was attacked. Despite its navy being stretched thin,
the British navy had two things going in its favor. First, by chance, the navy had been
fully mobilized for its annual naval maneuvers which finished about a week prior to the
declaration of war (June 25) and Winston Churchill alertly held off the order to
demobilize; thus he had a fully mobilized fleet as war broke out on the Continent.
Second, as result of the French-British friendship and naval discussions, during the
previous two years France had sent its fleet to protect French and English interests
(specifically commerce) in the Mediterranean. Consequently, France’s northern and
western coast lacked naval protection and England was free to concentrate her naval
forces elsewhere. While this placed an obligation (on English honor at the very least) on
England, it maintained a position of neutrality by not officially agreeing to protect the
French coast, and when war was imminent, to obtain an agreement with Germany not to
attack these coasts as long as England remained neutral.2 Grey concludes that the naval
arms race influenced the decision but was not the decisive cause
Grey’s next major discussion is on Belgian neutrality as a possible cause for Great
Britain’s entrance into the war on the side of France and Russia. When Archduke Franz
Ferdinand of Austria and his wife were killed by a member of the Black Hand
Organization (Serbian extremist group that sought unification of all lands in the AustroHungarian Empire that were inhabited by Serbs) on Austro-Hungarian soil, general world
opinion was with Austria-Hungary in its desire to seek justice. Austria issued demands
that even German officials acknowledged as unrealistic; consequently, a single act in the
Balkans drew all of Europe into a war that encompassed the entire European continent.
Most British politicians were unwilling to get involved in a war that had nothing to do
with England. Great Britain had carefully avoided treaties that would require it to go to
war if the other country was attacked. It was signatory to only two such treaties, the
Anglo Japanese Alliance and the treaty to defend Belgian neutrality. The only obligation
England had in Europe was to defend Belgium if it was invaded. When the first German
soldier set foot on Belgian soil, England had an obligation to declare war on Germany. It
was not a question of imperialism, economics, or ideological differences; it was keeping
a promise that was made when England signed the Treaty of London in 1831. Germany
committed the one action that guaranteed Great Britain’s entrance into the war. Grey
concludes that this violation was what ultimately caused England to declare war on
Germany.3
“Guns of August” was written by Barbara W. Tuchman and published in 1962. It
eventually won the Pulitzer Prize (as would another one of her books). Tuchman was an
amateur historian who meticulously researched her topic. This style can be seen on the
emphasis placed military strategy tactics instead of abstract concepts (ex. significance of
the war on modern English foreign policy) which are the trademark of the professional.
Tuchman first discusses the naval arms race. What convinced Germany to reject
Great Britain’s offer of her navy? She had no need of a navy, as Tuchman states, “As a
land power, Germany could have fought any possible combination of continental powers
2Ibid, 220.
’Ibid, 220.
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without interruption of her seaborne supplies as long as Britain... remained neutral” and
with Britain as an ally England would not only remain neutral, but would prevent any
other navy from interrupting these supplies.4 The fault for this can be found not in
Germany but in America. The American admiral, Alfred T. Mahan, wrote the book “The
Influence of Sea Power on History”, in 1890 and “demonstrated that he who controls
communications by sea controls his fate” and that “the master of the seas is master of the
situation.5” This book influenced “the impressionable [Kaiser] Wilhelm,” and convinced
him that Germany needed to be a major player on the seas as well as on the land.
Germany had a great industrial capacity and quickly sought to catch up with Britain, yet
war was only five years away. Great Britain had little respect for Germany’s naval force
prior to 1914. In 1912, Lord of the Navy, Winston Churchill, referred to it as a luxury
fleet, but on the eve o f war disregard had turned to strong apprehension. By 1914,
Germany had a large modem fleet that ranged from massive Dreadnaughts to the latest
naval weapon, the submarine. The British Fleet was still superior in size and firepower,
but it was spread thin. The multitude of tasks that consisted of guarding against an
invasion of the British Isles, escorting the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) safely to the
continent, transporting troops from India (to reinforce the Regular Army,) and most
importantly, guarding oceanic trade throughout every ocean of the world meant that the
fleet could not afford individual ship losses. Tuchman concludes by indicating that the
naval threat was insufficient to convince the British government to declare war on
Germany.6
Tuchman supports the German violation of Belgian neutrality as the ultimate
cause of Great Britain’s decision to support the Entente militarily. Which ever country
violated Belgian neutrality first would determine which side Great Britain would join in
the Great War. During a conversation between Lord Brett Reginald Baliol Esher of
England and Major Huguet, in 1911, Esher cautioned that if France was “’the first to
cross the Belgian border’...England could never be on their side.7” The French
ambassador to England (M. Cambon) later relayed a similar message when he stated that,
“only if Germany violated Belgium...could France be sure of Britain’s support.8” At
3:30 PM on August 1, 1914 France ordered the mobilization of its military forces, at 8:02
AM on August 4, 1914, “the first wave of field grey broke over the Belgian frontier,9”
and at 12 AM on August 15, 1914, England declared war on Germany. Germany drew
first blood but in the process brought the full weight of the English military (navy and
army) down upon itself.10
“German Atrocities 1914 A History of Denial” was written by John Horne and
Alan Kramer. Both authors are professors and fellows in the Contemporary History
Department (Horne is an Associate Professor and Kramer is a Senior Lecturer) at Trinity
College in Dublin, Ireland. This book, published in 2001, won the Frankel Prize for
Contemporary History and because it sought to understand why the atrocities were
committed, how the accounts of the actions were exaggerated in propaganda, what the
4 Tuchman, Barbara W. Guns of August. New York: Ballantine Books, 1962. Pg. 390
5 Ibid, 390.
6 Ibid, 390.
7 Ibid, 237.
8 Ibid, 339.
9 Ibid, 239.
10 Ibid, 239.
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precedents were for these actions, and where else did atrocities of this nature occur
during the war.
Home and Kramer discuss the possibility of German atrocities being what mainly
pushed England to declare war on Germany. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, a
large number of civilians took up arms against the invading German force and the
Germans responded by refusing to treat these French citizens as soldiers. Captured
resistance fighters were executed, their homes and villages were burned, and family
members and neighbors were used as hostages to prevent further resistance. These
techniques were successful in eliminating the resistance, and helped Germany defeat the
French. This past experience taught the German Army to expect another ‘franc-tireur
war’ (war conducted secretly by civilians against the opposing army) when they invaded
France; however, they expected no resistance, civilian or military, when they marched
through Luxembourg and Belgium. German officers were trained to handle the civilian
resistance in the same way that the German Army had done in 1870. The existence of the
‘franc-tireur’ movement in Belgium on the scale that Germans claimed was unrealistic.
To have organized such a highly organized movement with so little time to prepare was
unrealistic; however, testimony acquired from captured German soldiers indicates that,
among the rank and file of the German Army, there was a real fear of the ‘franc-tireur.’
The German atrocities though real were largely exaggerated. While many atrocities took
place, for the British, “lack of direct involvement in the early fighting and a tight news
blackout resulted in ‘atrocities’ being ignored until the third week of the war.11” They
ultimately conclude that these atrocities were not England’s primary motivation to
mobilize on August 4, 1914. 12
“Sexual violence and family honor: British propaganda and international law
during the first World War,” written by Nicoletta F. Gullace and appeared in ‘The
American Historical Review” in 1997. It provides a new perspective on the changing
role of propaganda during the Great War. Gullace is an assistant professor of history at
the University of New Hampshire. Gullace addresses two main points in her article
concerning England and WWI.
The first point is the effect of the propaganda about the German atrocities on
British foreign policy. The initial propaganda in England was aimed at the educated and
upper classes in British society (lawyers, businessmen, politicians, etc.) It wasn’t until a
month into the war that the propaganda began targeting the middle and lower classes.
“What began as an outcry among intellectuals over the destruction of European treaty
law, ended as a public condemnation of brutal acts of atrocity committed against women
and the family.13” The conclusion is that propaganda about atrocities never had a strong
influence on the policy14.
The second point is the effect of propaganda about the Germany’s violation of
Belgium neutrality on British Foreign policy. “For British publicists and their
sympathizers, the central issue of the war-the ‘cause’-both in the sense of the trigger and
1 Horne, John, Kramer, Alan. German Atrocities 1914 A History o f Denial. New Haven, CT, 2001. Yale U

and P. Pg. 400
Ibid, 400.
Gullace, Nicolleta F. “Sexual violence and family honor: British propaganda and international law during
the first World War.” The American Historical Review Vol. 102 (Jun 1997): 719
Ibid, 719.
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the moral impetus, was the German violation of Belgium neutrality on August 4, 1914.15
In Britain, one of the most famous phrases of the war was “scrap of paper” which was in
reference to the German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s statement in an interview
(Berlin, August 4, 1914) that Germany and England were at war just for “a word—
‘neutrality’.. .just for a scrap of paper.15l6” Atrocities were used to motivate the common
man who was the backbone of the war effort, but to the intellectuals and leaders of the
various political groups, the true crime was ignoring that “scrap o f paper.” She concludes
that it was the propaganda about Germany’s violation of the Treaty of London which
ultimately resulted in the British declaration of war on Germany.
These three sources use British foreign policy, British actions, and an analysis of
British propaganda to support the theory that Germany’s violation of Belgian neutrality
was the cause of the war. The sources are correct but they fail to fully emphasize that the
reason why Belgium was even given her sovereignty was to make the strategic territory
that she occupied unavailable to any belligerent nation. England was no longer backing
France in a continental war but defending itself from an enemy who “challenge[d] the
essential principles of liberal ideology17.”
The three most likely causes were the naval arms race, German atrocities against
the populace of the territory it conquered, and that Germany violated Belgium neutrality.
Through the use of the four previously discussed sources, the Germany violation of
Belgium neutrality can conclusively be recognized as the main cause for Great Britain
entering World War I on the side of France and Russia.

15 Ibid, 717.
16 Ibid, 720.
17 Ibid, 720.
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